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HUMAN SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND
THIRD WORLD CONCERNS
PRIYANKAR UPADHYAYA*

Concepts come and go; they do not stay aroundforever. "Human security" is
in, "Humanitarian intervention " is on its way out.I
The attenuation of global rivalries in the nineties raised new hopes and paved
the way for realizing the dream of building a sustainable peace through global
consensus and humanitarian law. It evoked expectations that the international
community, led by the United Nations, would go beyond inter-state military threats
and focus on the developmental and human rights issues which were sidelined
during the long decades of the Cold War. Innovative notions like human security,
peace-building, and global governance enriched the lexicon of international
relations.
However, the initial optimism has been short lived. The decade following the
end of Cold War has seen an unprecedented spurt of violent conflicts and other
non-traditional security threats; the international community is divided as never
before. Although the hotbeds of most of these conflicts are in the developing
South or the Third World, 2 their ramifications are directly felt all the way into the
Northern heartland in the form of refugee outflows, drug trafficking, organized
crime, and health epidemics. The scourge of terrorism along with the rising scale
of structural and cultural violence, have discounted the initial euphoria that the
world would be a safer place after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the
unbridled sweep of globalized commerce, often to the detriment of the povertystricken Third World, the unabashed pursuance of unilateralism by the world's sole
superpower, and an increasingly feeble role of the United Nations has demoralized
a large chunk of democratic opinion the world over. The Agenda for Peace,
* Director, Malaviya Centre of Peace Studies, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi (India). I would like
to thank the Department of Political Science, United States Air force Academy where much of the
research for this paper was done while I served the Academy as a Fulbright Professor.
1.Johan Galtung, Human Needs, HumanitarianIntervention, Human Security - and the War in
Iraq, Transcend: A Peace and Development Network (Feb. 12, 2004) (Keynote Address, Sophia
University/ICU, Tokyo (12/14/2003) and Regional Studies Association, Tokyo, (01/10/2004)), at
http://www.transeend.org/t-database/articles.php?ida=262.
2. Although there is no "Second World" any more, the term "Third World" has been preferred to
other alternative terms such as "developing world" and "the South" to highlight the historical disparities
between the West and the post colonial states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
3. "By the end of the 1990s ...Pax Americana seemed to have become bellum americanum, as
the desire to keep the peace took second place to a desire to accomplish 'good' through war. Neutral
intervention under the auspices of the UN gave way to support for one side in a conflict, from Bosnia
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which signaled a new era of international peace and security not long ago, no
longer serves as a blueprint for security in the new millennium. 4 The acrimony and
contentions over "so-called" humanitarian interventions have led the scholars to
doubt its continuing relevance. There is also a growing skepticism about the notion
of human security in the Third World. How do we account for these paradoxical
developments?
The paper explores the ramifications of human security as an alternative
security discourse and the problem of evolving a universally accepted framework
to implement it. It also analyzes the convergent and divergent perspectives on
humanitarian intervention, particularly the fault lines between humanitarianism
and realpolitik. The focus is on the Third World concerns and prospects of forging
a truly global consensus on these critical issues.
From State Security to People's Security
It has never been easy to conceptualize the notion of security around some
universally agreed parameters as, "it involves not only the capabilities, desires and
fears of individuals and states but also the capabilities, desires and fears of other
individuals and states with which they interact."5 It has meant different things for
policy makers and analysts in different times and involves such subjective
questions as: Security for whom? Security from what? And, by what means?
Moreover, the dominant political and strategic community invariably has the upper
hand in molding the discourse on security, both in national and international
society. "Security is an empowering word" remarks Navnita C. Behera, "[i]t both
sets political priorities and justifies the use of force. The way security is
understood and used profoundly affects the way political life is conducted.",6 It is
therefore critical to unravel the political and intellectual lineage of the traditional
security discourse before delineating the concept of human security.
The traditional notion of security has derived typically from the growth of
nation-states in Europe. Having resolved their internal security challenges through
a long and arduous process of state building, the European nation-states
understandably defined security exclusively in the context of a state's ability to
counter external threats to its state's vital interests and core values. The state, as
the exclusive
referent object of security, was to guarantee the security of
"citizens." 7 The two World Wars, followed by the intense bipolar jostling,
and Herzegovina to Kosovo to Sierra Leone." Hurst Hannum, Bellum Americanum, 27 SPG FLETCHER
F. WORLD AFF. 29 (2003).
4. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report by the
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter An Agenda for Peace].
5. Barry Buzan, Regional Security, Arbejdspapier Working Papers, Centre for Peace and Conflict
Research, Copenhagen at 1 (28/1989).
6. Navnita C. Behera, Discourses on Security: South Asian Perspectives, Occasional Paper Series
IIl, Malaviya Centre for Peace Research, p.1 (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.mcprbhu.org/Publication.htm.
7. Bhikhu Parekh expresses well the core assumption of the 'statist' approach. "Citizens are the
exclusive responsibility of their state, and their state is entirely their own business." Nicholas J.
Wheeler & Alex J.Bellamy, Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 473 (John Baylis & Steve Smith
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schematized the state-centric notion of security and reinforced its militaristic
trappings. The western politico-military constellations were quick to define the
international security in terms of the East-West confrontation8 and viewed any
policy of abstaining from the Cold War with suspicion. As Peter Willets
remarked, "[t]he Cold War belligerents, with their 'those who are not with us are
against us' do not recognize any policy and decision to abstain from the Cold
War.9 The oft-quoted description of nonalignment by the U.S. Secretary of State's
John Foster Dulles as "an immoral and shortsighted conception,"' o is a case in
point. It is suggested that the deliberate conflation of the U.S. national security
with global security "rendered U.S. imperial interests justifiable, to make it the
normal and desirable state of affairs."" The western sponsored strategic schema
was globalized by the realist paradigm, and its modified version-the neorealist
school of thought, emphasized the importance of power in enhancing security in
the international anarchy of world politics. 2
The protests from thinkers and philosophers in different cultures, seeking a
broader and transnational vision of security embodying development and social
justice issues have been mostly on the sidelines of the academic discourse. 13 The
pacifist traditions such as Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, despite their
perceptive criticism of realism and an alternate vision of security (almost identical
to the human security), were mostly ignored. 14 The overwhelming salience of
bipolar politics never allowed the focus to shift from the security of national

eds., 2001) (quoting Bhikhu Parekh).
8. See, e.g. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Heritage of Weakness: An Assessment of the 1970s, in
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980's: FROM WEAKNESS TO STRENGTH 17-51 (W. Scott Thompson ed.,

1980).
9. PETER WILLETS, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: THE ORIGINS OF A THIRD WORLD

ALLIANCE 20 (1978).
10. J.F Dulles, The Cost of Peace, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1956, at 999-1000.
11. Behera, supra note 6, at 2 (quoting Robert Luckham).
12. See generally E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS: 1919-1939 (1939) (the trendsetter of
realist writing); see also HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (2d ed. 1948, 3d ed. 1960, 5th ed. revised 1978) (the most influential work of realist
writing); see also JOHN A. VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: FROM CLASSICAL REALISM TO
NEOTRADITIONALISM (1998).

13. See Gene Sharp, Beyond Just War and Pacifism: Nonviolent Struggle towards Justice,
Freedom and Peace, in VIOLENCE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 317-333
(Manfred B. Steger & Nancy S. Lind, eds., 1999).
14. Johan Galtung's term "positive peace," Kenneth Boulding's "stable peace," and John Burton's
"human needs" approach could be perceived easily as precursors of the recent conceptualization of
Human Security. See Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 166, 183
(1969); Kenneth Boulding, Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL.342,
348-49 (1978); CONFLICT: HUMAN NEEDS THEORY 1-4 (John W. Burton, ed., 1990). However "some
peace researchers raised concerns that a broadened notion of peace and security would divert attention
from disarmament...." Ho-WON JEONG, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 26
(2000). See also Bjorn Moller, National, Societal and Human Security: General Discussion with a Case
Study from the Balkans, What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?, Proceedings
from the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions 41,
Astri
UNESCO (2001), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001238/123834e.pdf;
Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests ofStates, 30 SEC. DIALOGUE 265 (1999).
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boundaries, territorial integrity, and the integrity of state institutions.
However, the political transference of the past two decades, particularly the
lifting of the cold war overlay, dramatically unraveled the inadequacies of statecentric security in meeting the challenges of the 21st Century. 5 The changed
"global landscape ...was marked by pervasive poverty and deepening inequality
within and between states."'16 Unchecked population growth, unbridled
globalization and inequitable distribution of wealth are now provoking political
strife in many countries, sometimes leading to social disintegration and armed
conflict. 17 The gravest threats to security today come from within nations, not
from invading armies. "Of the 20 countries with the lowest scores on the human
18
development index in 2002, 16 were in conflict or just out of it.'
As population

pressures build, and local resources collapse, people often resort to ethnic,
religious, or other group-based identities for protection. Among the most
vulnerable are the poor people that comprise two-thirds of the population in the socalled Third World, whose living on ecologically fragile lands are increasingly
marginalized. 19 These societal threats arising in any part of the world have
portents for threatening global security in today's integrated and globalized world.
Evidently the challenges of the twenty-first century necessitate an expanded
notion of security which is not restricted to the well being of the state but takes
care of basic security needs of the citizens residing therein. However, the realist
paradigm has no theoretical tools to capture the complexity of identity-based
conflicts or to produce effective policies toward conflict resolution. As aptly
remarks E. Fuat Keyman: "[r]ealism falls short insofar as it privileges the state as
the main actor and limits its focus toward interstate relations. By neglecting
economic and cultural factors, it reduces casual potential to the level of the
anarchical international system. 2 ° Johan Galtung puts it even more squarely:
"[w]hen rape and ethnic cleansing is used as an instrument of war, when thousands
are killed by floods resulting from ravaged countryside and when citizens are
killed by their own security forces, then it is just
insufficient to think of security in
21
terms of national or territorial security alone.",

15. Early rethinking on post-bipolar security was done by several scholars. See Stephen M. Walt,
The Renaissance of Security Studies, 35 INT'L STUD. Q 211(1991); Barry Buzan, New Patterns of
Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, 67 INT'L AFF. 431 (1991); Edward A. Kolodziej, What is
Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War, 13 ARMS CONTROL 1 (1992); see also David
Baldwin, Review Article: Security Studies at the End of the Cold War, 48 WORLD POL. 117 (1995).
17Caroline Thomas, Global Governance and Human Security, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 113 (Rorden Wilkinson & Steve Hughes eds., 2002).
17. EMIN FUAT KEYMAN, GLOBALIZATION, STATE, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: TOWARD A CRITICAL

SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 210 (1997); see also Thomas, supra note 17, at 116117.
18. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN SECURITY Now 21 (2003). [hereinafter HUMAN
SECURITY NOW].
19. See MICHAEL RENNER, FIGHTING FOR SURVIVAL: ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE, SOCIAL

CONFLICT AND THE NEW AGE OF INSECURITY 83 (1996).
20. Keyman, supra note 17, at 210.
21. Moller, supra note 14.
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No wonder the end of the Cold War inaugurated a renaissance in security
studies. Ranging from critical theories, which draw on postmodernism and
feminism and pose fundamental disagreements with the core categories of
traditional security studies, we also have "new thinking" within the mainstream
security discourse which seeks to widen the security debate by incorporating
societal threats that affect not only states but also groups and individuals and other
non state actors.22
However, it is the construction of human security discourse, which has
attracted the widest interest among the policy makers, scholars, and civil society
actors. It makes a fundamental transference in the security analysis by bringing
people and society within the template of security. Indeed the construct of human
security has become a catchphrase employed not only with the United Nations and
its allied agencies but also, lately, by various states. Still there are divergent
expositions offered by academia, state policies, and NGO sectors about what it
entails, what should be its focus, and how it is to be operationalized.
Interpreting Human Security
The earliest traces of human security concern could be discerned in the 1970s
when the human rights and development activists conceptualized an umbilical link
between disarmament and development. During this phase, an influential group of
peace researchers also came out with an alternate paradigm based on basic human
needs, which soon caught attention of the members of the U.N. family. It tried to
aggregate the basic human rights with such basic needs as food, clothing, housing,
health, and education. 23 These impulses led to various initiatives in the seventies
and the eighties including the Independent Commission on International
Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt, the Olof Palme-led Independent
Commission on Disarmament Security Issues and Bruntland Commission, and the
Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. Nevertheless, it took a
while for the concept to take roots and proliferate.
The first current usage of Human Security appeared in the Human
Development Reports sponsored by the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP).24 Starting with 1993, the UNDP reports built upon and refined this
concept. 25 In 1994, the Human Development Report focused explicitly on human
security and defined it around two aspects: freedom from fear and freedom from
want, which include safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and

22. See generally THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD
POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996). See generally Barry Buzan, Re-thinking Security After the
Cold War, 32(1) COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 5, (1997) (Also significant is the contribution of the
Copenhagen School, which mainstreams societal concerns within the security discourse.); Ole Waever,
Securitization & Desecuritization,in ON SECURITY 46 (Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995); BARRY BUZAN
ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1998).
23. Galtung supra note 1, at 5 (Attributed essentially to Johan Galtung, the Basic Human Needs
(BHN) draws on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the Social, Economic and
Cultural
Covenant of 1966).
25
26

See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1993 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2 (1993).
See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1994 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3 (1994).
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repressions, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of
daily life.26 The Report identified five steps: a human development conception
with emphasis on equity, sustainability, and grassroots participation; a peace
dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership
between North and South based on justice and equitable access to global market
opportunities and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance
built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World
Bank, and the
27
United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society.
Further, the UNDP Report listed seven "components," or specific values of
human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental
security, personal security, community security, and political security. 28 The
Canadian-led middle powers' approach subsequently endorsed by Norway makes a
common cause with the core elements of UNDP definition when it incorporates
"an acceptable quality of life" which, minimally, connotes physical safety and
well-being, and "a guarantee of fundamental human rights" which means freedom
from pervasive threats to the rights, the safety, or the lives of people. 29 The
Japanese Government also defines human security, as "[tjhe preservation and
protection of the life and dignity of individual human beings... that... can be
ensured30 only when the individual is confident of a life free of fear and free of
want.,

However, the Canadian government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd
Axworthy, linked human security more explicitly to human rights and
humanitarian law and critiqued the UNDP version "for focusing too much on
threats associated with underdevelopment at the expense of human insecurity
resulting from violent conflict.",3 1 The Canadian view was endorsed by the other

middle powers like Norway which joined Canada in a Human Security
Partnership. 32 "The partnership identified a nine-point agenda of human security:
landmines, formation of an International Criminal Court, human rights,
27id.
28 See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 1994 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT

(1994).
28. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,

1994 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 22

(1994).
29. Louis Hamel, Toward Human Security: A People-centered Approach to Foreign Policy,
Keynote address at the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training
Institutions,

in

WHAT AGENDA

FOR HUMAN

SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY?

15

(UNESCO, Nov. 27-28, 2002), [hereinafter Hamel]. (However it is the distinct emphasis on "the threat
of violence that distinguishes the human security objectives of Canadian foreign policy"). See,
Handling
Human
Security,
15(4)
PEACE
MAGAZINE
13,
14
(1999),
http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/v 15n4p 13.htm
30. Yukio Takasu, Toward Effective Cross-Sectional Partnershipto Ensure Human Security in a
Globalized World, Statement at the Third Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, (June 19,
2000),_http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human-secu?spechOOO6.html.
31. Amitav Acharya, Human Security: East Versus West, 56(3) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 445.
Hamel, supra note 29, at 15. ("It is the threat of violence that distinguishes the human security
objectives of Canadian foreign policy" from that of UNDP).
33 Acharya, supra note 31, at 445.
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international humanitarian law, women and children in armed conflict, small arms
proliferation, child soldiers, child labour, and northern co-operation." 33 This
norms of
transference reflected "a new international climate marked by changing
34
state sovereignty with particular regard to human rights protection."
The notions of human security are very far removed from the liberal notions
of "security of individual," which entails competitive and possessive
individualism. 35 They, however, focus particularly on reducing the systemic
insecurities threatening individual lives.36 Referring to the key elements of human
security, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan remarked:
Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of
violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to
education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities
and choices to fulfill his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a
reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing
step toward
37
conflict.
Thus, in policy terms human security is an integrated, sustainable,
comprehensive security from fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural
deprivation, and hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms. At many
levels, these human security arguments share a common genealogy with other
much-recognized concepts as human development and human rights. As remarks
Louis Hamel, Permanent Delegate of Canada to UNESCO, "[h]uman security is
brother and sister to human development. Human security provides the sheltering
environment for human development, the social peace and freedom from fear that
make development practical. 38 As amplified by the Commission on Human
Security: "it necessitates the involvement of a range of non-state organizations and
entities; and its success depends not only on protecting people but also
empowering them." 39 Seemingly, the construct of human security strives to
reconcile humanitarianism and developmental concerns on the one hand, and
international security on the other. However, of late "the tension between those
embracing politics of development and those supporting human security paradigm
has intensified because the transnational dimensions embodied within the latter
approach have been under assessed. ' 4°

Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 445.

35

Thomas, supra note 17, at 114-15.
37Thomas, supra note 17, at 115-16.
37. Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human
2000),
8,
(May
Mongolia
in
Security
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html.
38. Hamel, supra 29, at 15.
39. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supranote 18.
40. Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and
HumanitarianIntervention, 33(2) SECURITY DIALOGUE 177 (2002).
36
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Toward Peace -Building
The notion of peace-building corresponds closely to human security.4' Peace
researchers and allied scholarship in conflict resolution have long emphasized 42a
broader meaning of peace, which could deal with the generic causes of conflict.
As observed by Paul Cornish, "[r]eal peace is much more than stability, order, and
the absence of war: peace is transformative, about individual and societal progress
and fulfillment; and peace within and between societies is as much about justice as
any thing else."' 3 As delineated earlier, the concept of basic human needs and
structural violence with their emphasis on oppression and exclusion as generic
causes of violent conflict provides a ready platform to the human security
discourse. 44 Revealing complementarities between the contemporary notions of
positive peace with human security, An Agenda for Peace called for "an integrated
approach to human security" that would address "... . the deepest causes of
conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression. ' 45 Much like
the conception of positive peace, the defining feature of human security is the
'vulnerability' of three categories of victims: those of war and internal conflict,
those living at or below subsistence levels, and victims of natural disaster.46 The
UNDP Reports and the subsequent Human Security Now both admit that the
threats to human security at the societal level are often the root causes of protracted
internal violence and thus recommend peace-building as the support for divided
societies in their efforts to prevent internal threats to human security.47 Echoing
this, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan observed, "[w]e must also broaden
our view of what is meant by peace and security. Human security can no longer be
understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic
development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization,
disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.'' 4
Against National Security?
Seemingly, human security does not find any contradiction between the
people's security and the state security - the two layers of security. 49 In the words
41. See John Linarelli, Peace-Building,24 DENy, J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 253,253-83 (1996).

42. Id.
43. Paul Cornish, Terrorism, Insecurity and Underdevelopment, I J. CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV.
30, 147-52 (2001).
44. JOIAN GALTUNG, Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and
Peacebuilding, in PEACE, WAR AND DEFENSE: ESSAYS IN PEACE RESEARCH at 282-304 (Christian

Ejlers ed.) (1976).
45. An Agenda for Peace,supra note 3, at 43-44.
46. See Astrid Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests of States, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 3,
265-76 (1999).
47. JOHN G. COCKELL., Peace building and Human Security: Frameworks for International
Responses to Internal Conflict, in PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT: PAST RECORD AND FUTURE
CHALLENGES, at 210-11, (Peter Wallensteen, ed.) (1998).

48. Kofi Annan, Letters to future generations: Towards a Culture of Peace, at
http://www.unesco.org/opi2/lettres/TextAnglais/AnnanE.html.
49. Michael Ignatieff, Peace, Order and Good Government: A Foreign Policy Agenda for
Canada, Skelton Lecture given at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (March
12, 2004) (transcript availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/skelton/lecture-2004-en.asp).
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of Heinbbecker, human security is about "the ability to protect people as well as to
safeguard states., 50 However, it surely takes a critical view of neglecting societal
security in the name of safeguarding national security.
Human Security Now emphasized that although human security
complements state security, there may be situations in which "it often fails to fulfill
its security obligations - and at times has even become a source of threats to its
own people., 51 The Canadian approach, often seen as disfavoring the issue of state
security, 52 argues that since the Cold War it is increasingly clear that national
security is insufficient to guarantee people's security. 53 The Canadian idea finds
that though the security of the state is a necessary condition of human security; it is
not a sufficient condition. An official document of the Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade thus observes: "When states are externally
aggressive, internally repressive, or too weak to govern effectively, human security
suffers. In such cases, the international community will hear calls for intervention
and humanitarian necessity may ultimately outweigh arguments of sovereignty. 54
In the similar vein, a Report of International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, envisions the world of states as a series of interlocking duty holders
toward the populations they are supposed to serve and where one state fails in its
duties, other states must step in: to stop the killing, feed the hungry, restore order,
and return sovereignty to those who can fulfill their duties. 5
Post 9/11 Transference
The terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent "global war on
terror" have distorted the discourse on human security in various ways. 56 As Mark
Drumble remarks: "[r]esponse to atrocities of September 11 whether on the level
of modifying the rules regarding a self-rule, avoiding strict adherence to the
approval of use of force, demonstrating diffidence to the Geneva Convention, or
the exceptional use of military commission-may signify a movement away from

50. P. Heinbecker, 56 Human Security 2, (1999) cited in Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes,
supra note 16, at 114. A leading public figure in India thus opined that "(f)rontiers of a State are
important but so are frontiers of human dignity." See M.N. Venkatachaliah, Former Chief Justice of
India, Proceedings of World Congress on Human Rights, Institute for World Congress on Human
Rights, India International Centre, New Delhi, 21-22 (November 1997).
51. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 18, at 2.
52. See Acharya, supra note 31, at 443.
53. Freedomfrom Fear: Canada'sForeign Policyfor Human Security, Human Security Program,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade at 2 (2003), available at
http://www.humansecurity.gc.capsh-brief-en.asp.
54. Id.
55. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility To
Protect,International Development Research Centre, Ottawa (2001), at http://www.idrc.ca [hereinafter
The Responsibility to Protect].
56. See Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
available
at
L.
993
(2001),
12
EUR.
J.
INT'L
International Law,
http://www.ejil.org/journalVoll2/No5/index.html.; Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Imbalance
of Powers: How Changes to US. Law & Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties,
Sept. 2002 - March 2003 (details U.S. legislation in the aftermath of Sept. 11,2001, and its effect on
human rights), availableat http://www.lchr.org/us law/loss/imbalance/powers.
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legalism. '5 7 The formal announcement of the policy of unilateralism by the United
States, through its National Security Strategy,58 saw the downgrading of
multilateral institutions and the United Nations. Referring to this trend, Human
Security Now observes:
In response to the threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, states may revert to a narrower understanding of state securityrather than foster human security. Under the guise of waging a war against
terrorism, human rights and humanitarian law are being violated. Even
are being reviewed.
commitments to earlier international agreements
59
Humanitarian action now also seems to be in crisis.
The post 9/11 responses by the United States created a paradox for those
defining human security as freedom from fear. While the generic causes of
terrorism defined in terms of poverty, inequality, and injustice remained tangential,
more and more investment in human and material resources is being made to
reinforce the traditional arsenal of the national security state to counter terrorism. It
is true that terrorism violates the human security of the noncombatant and thus
necessitates counter-terrorism measures to protect individuals as well as states.
However, it also creates grounds for human rights abuse. The contention on
"homeland security" is a case in point. What is worse is the blatant defiance of the
international law by the world's largest protagonist of democratic values. Critics
point out that:
[t]he war on Iraq crisis may only serve to reinforce the skepticism of many
people around the world who see international law as a set of commitments that are
routinely ignored by governments or worse still, selectively implemented to benefit
the strong at the exclusion of the weak. This would undermine the security of all of
60

us.

What is worse is that the vision of the world's largest national security state
has served as a role model of several Third World states. As pungently observed
by the editorial of Refugee Watch published in India:
A nationalist state's dream is perhaps to transform itself into a national
security state. When the transformation occurs, it needs to create its other in the
form of an enemy alien. It needs an enemy to hate and it needs a terrain where
glorious wars of national retribution can be fought out. Who better to teach us
mastered the art of
these lessons in realpolitik than the United States that has
61
creating a nameless enemy alien in its war against terrorism.
57. Mark Drumble, Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, Western Victims and InternationalLaw, 31
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 111

(2003).

58. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (developed in the midst of the debate over Iraq and submitted
to Congress in September 2002).
59. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supranote 18, at 5.
60. Mary Robinson, Shaping Globalization: The Role of Human Rights, The Fifth Annual Grotius
h
Lecture, American Society of InternationalLaw 91 Annual Meeting (April 2, 2003), in 19 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1, 8 (2003), availableat http://www.eginitiative.org/documents/grotius.html.
61. South Asian Forum for Human Rights, Editorial, 18 REFUGEE WATCH 1 (April 2003),

2004

HUMAN SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ...

There are clear indications that in the post 9/11 phase, the states have
increasingly resorted to harder military measures to quell dissidence and separatist
movements taking the umbrage under the global war on terrorism. Surely the
increasing exposure of the way the United States distorted information about Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction has blurred the line between humanitarian
intervention (which can be a tool, albeit an extreme one, of human security) and
intervention carried out for national security intentions. Mary Robinson, former
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, while recognizing the need to stamp
out terrorism, cautioned against the threat of human rights violations posed by
counter terrorism measures.62 She found "[h]uman rights as a 'uniting framework"
for states in the face of human insecurity created by international terrorism., 63 In
this light, she endorses the idea of human security as it places "individuals and
their universal rights at the centre of national and global security policy" and
encourages a "comprehensive strategy64to address the causes of insecurity, not only
its consequences and manifestations."
Reconciling "humanitarian" with "realpolitik"?
Unlike humanitarian assistance that provides aid with the consent of the host
state and other ground-level actors, humanitarian intervention refers to the use of
force to protect a threatened or victimized population, from either local actors
whom the government is unable or unwilling to control, or from the government
itself. There are diverse opinions whether such intervention could be legal without
Security Council authorization under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 65 There is
also an ongoing debate between restrictionists and counter-restrictionists; the
former disfavoring forcible humanitarian intervention on the grounds of Article
2(4) and Article 2(7) of the Charter and the latter reinterpreting international legal
provisions to legitimize intervention.66 Hedley Bull, for instance, insists on the
reciprocal recognition of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention in evolving
a consensus on what principles should govern collective humanitarian
intervention. 67 Conversely, the counter-restrictionists such as Anthony Clark
Arend and Robert J. Beck argue that states have both a legal right and a moral
obligation to intervene in exceptional cases that offend against minimum standard
of humanity. 6i The notion that there is an emerging guiding principle in favor of
availableat http://www.safhr.org/refugee.watch I8.htm.
62. See Robinson, supra note 60.
63. Id.
64. Diana Ayton-Shenker, A Global Agenda: Issues Before the 5 7a General Assembly of the
United Nations, (an annual publication of the United Nations Association of the United States of
America), (Lanham, ed.) (2002).
65. Embracing the Elephant: Perspectives on Humanitarian Operations: A Policy Brief (A
Workshop Report of the Academic Council of the United Nations System (ACUNS) and American
Society of International Law (ASIL) at 2 (arguing that humanitarian intervention without Security
Council authorization, is often justified under the so called "right to intervene", but this interpretation
remains controversial), availableat www.acuns.wlu.ca/publications (last visited September 23, 2004).
66. See generally A. C. AREND & R.J BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 131-

2 (1993).
67. See generally H.BULL, INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 193-94 (1984).
68. See generally AREND & BECK, supra note 66, at 132-7.
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military intervention for human protection purposes is also supported by a wide
variety of legal sources including sources that exist independently of any duties,
responsibilities, or authority that may be derived from Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. 69 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
thus emphasized the responsibility of states and the international community to
protect people militarily in situations resulting in "a large scale loss of life, actual
or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of either
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a collapsed state
situation; or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended,
whether carried
70
out by killing, force expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.,
As such, customary international law has been unreceptive not only to
unilateral intervention in domestic affairs, but also to collective coercive action
except in cases of threats to peace, breaches of peace, and aggression. 71 The
international effort to protect human rights defied the norms of non-intervention
and domestic jurisdiction and was rarely considered a viable policy option. The
scope of enforcing the U.N. collective security was ostensibly constrained by
Article 2(4), which explicitly states that the Council is to act in accordance with
the principles and purposes of the organization. Similarly, Article 2(7), which
provides that nothing in the Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, requires
members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.72 There is
also a view which wants to put the issue of intervention beyond legality, as
suggests R.J. Vincent that "[i]t is not necessarily lawful
or unlawful, but it does
73
break a conventional pattern of international relations.,
Notwithstanding the theoretical contentions, the international community has
been under pressure to play a proactive role toward the recurrent episodes of
human catastrophes when major harm to civilians is occurring or imminently
apprehended, and the state in question is incapable or unwilling to protect their
own citizens Human rights are also increasingly viewed as rights possessed by the

69. See The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 55, at 16 for a rendition of these legal
foundations, which include fundamental natural law principles; the human rights provisions of the UN
Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights together with the Genocide Convention; the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law; the statute of the
International Criminal Court; and a number of other international human rights and human protection
agreements and covenants.
70. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 18, at 24.
71. See generally Tom Farer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention, in
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185-201 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J.

Scheffer eds., 1991). But cf Embracing the Elephant, supra note 65, at 9-12 (However, there are
emerging legal justifications for humanitarian intervention in customary international law especially
around the Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter).
72. See Embracing the Elephant supra note 65, at 4 (however, it contains one, and only one
exception - to wit that it shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
This exception was inserted deliberately to ensure that declarations of domestic jurisdiction could not
be used to impede Security Council efforts to maintain or restore international peace and security).
73. R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 13 (1974).
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74
individual for which there could be redress before the international community.
This new thinking has become more pronounced after spurts in internal violence in
which the state either acquiesced or collaborated with the violent groups. The
tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo have fostered a strong need to
reexamine the international legal tools available to respond to human
catastrophes.75 More than any other episode, it was the genocidal violence in
Rwanda which shook the consciousness of human kind as the international
assistance and intervention came too little and too late. The fumbled efforts of the
United Nations in Somalia and Bosnia once again underlined the lack of
international preparedness in legal and logistical terms to meet these new
challenges. 76

Conscious of the inadequacy of the existing provisions to deal with these
human emergencies, the U.N. community has been gearing itself in recent years to
meet such situations of internal violence, often defining these as a threat to
international peace and security to justify enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. It also adopted an aide memoire on the protection of civilians,
focusing on four themes: protection of civilians in conflict; women, peace and
security; children in armed conflict; and conflict prevention.77 In the similar vein,
an Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) was set up by the Canadian government in September 2000.78 The Report
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (known as the Brahimi
Report) recommended various reforms to conduct the peace operations of the
twenty-first century. 79
Under this changed scenario, the long-standing
international principles of non-intervention as enshrined in Article 2(7) were
revisited ostensibly on humanitarian grounds. It was argued that the enforcement

74. The Limits of Sovereignty, U.N. Doc. DPI/I 178 (1992) (the UN Secretary-General, Javier
Perez de Cuellar thus proposed a fresh and more innovative equilibrium between sovereignty and the
protection of human rights).
75. See generally Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and HaitiRevisiting the Validity of HumanitarianIntervention under InternationalLaw (pt. 1), DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 305 (1992); Ved Nanda, Amy E. Eckert & Thomas F. Muther, Jr., Tragedies in Somalia,
Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under
International Law (pt. 2) 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 827 (1998), available at
http//www.law.du.edu/ilj/onlineissues.html.
76. See generally Stanley Hoffman, HumanitarianIntervention in Former Yugoslavia in STANLEY
HOFFMANN, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 38-60 (1996); see generally
also Rosalyn Higgins, The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia, 69(3) INT'L AFFAIRS 165-83
(1993) (both articles present an excellent analysis of the U.N. failure in Yugoslavia); see also Age
Eknes, The United Nations' Predicament in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
CIVIL WARS 109-26 (THOMAS G. WEISS ed., 1995).
77. HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 18.
'9 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/menu-en.asp (last visited October 1, 2004).
79. The Henry L. Stimson Center, William J Durch, Victoria K Holt, Caroline R Earle & Moira K
Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (2003), available at
www.stimson.org/fopo/pubs.cfm?ID--90 (many recommendations viz strengthening conflict prevention
and peacebuilding, developing rapid deployment capacities and improving management are yet to be
implemented). HUMAN SECURITY Now, supra note 18, at 10.
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action stipulated in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter nullifies the right to invoke the
nonintervention principle contained in the Article 2(7) "[i]f it can be established
that a matter occurring within the territory of a state is essentially outside that
state's jurisdiction.,, 80 This new interpretation was employed in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. Once the issue of human rights violations by the Iraqi government
against the Kurds was framed as constituting a threat to international peace and
security, traditional "distinctions between domestic jurisdiction and foreign policy"
were set aside.8t However, it was the geostrategic matrix, rather than the
humanitarian concerns, which led to such drastic revision of non-intervention
norms.
Back in 1976, Johan Galtung had noted with considerable foresight that "with
internal wars becoming more important, not less, the unlimited doctrine of
humanitarian intervention will become increasingly anachronistic, and a search for
more discriminating criteria will have to start." 82 Almost three decades after his
observation, we still do not have a consensus on the ground rules for such
intervention. As remarks Michael Bothe: "People who attempt to apply existing
law to contemporary actions do not appear to be working with the same definitions
of sovereignty, preemptive self defense, or humanitarian intervention." For some,
all of those are a question of military security, for others they are the domains of
humanitarian mission., 83 Bhikhu Parekh, for instance, argues that humanitarian
intervention "is an act wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity,
compassion or fellow-feeling, and is in that sense disinterested. 84 Others admit
that "there are situations in which diplomatic and even economic measures are
inadequate to restructure the political situation. If forceful measures can change
the course toward a negotiated solution, a limited, politically informed use of
military force can be defended on purely humanitarian grounds." 85 Stanley
Hoffman has also pointed out the growing discrepancy between the norms of
sovereignty and the traditional legal organization of the international system, and
the realities of a world in which the distinction between domestic politics and
international politics is crumbling.86 Amid these ceaseless controversies, the
consensus which defined the international mood at the beginning of 1990's seems
to be crumbling.
80. W. Andy Knight, The Changing Human Rights Regime, State Sovereignty, And Article 2(7) in
the Post Cold War Era, in ARTICLE 2(7) REVISITED (Abiodun Williams et al. eds., 1994), available at

www.acuns.wlu.ca/publications.
81. Thomas G. Weiss & Kurt M. Cambell, Military Humanitarianism,33(5) SURVIVAL 451, 455
(1991).
82. Cockell, supra note 47, at 205.
83. Michael Bothe, Michael Bothe Professor of Law at Johann Wolfgang University in Frankfurt
reported in Redefining Sovereignty, MERSHON CTR. REPORT at 53 (2002-03) available at
www.mershon.ohio-state.edu.
84. Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention 18(1) INT'L POL. SC1. REV. 49-70
(1997).
85. Raimo Vayrynen, How Much Force in Humanitarian Intervention?, in THE ETHICS AND
POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION at 8-9 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1996).
86. Stanley Hoffmann, Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention, in THE ETHICS AND POLITICS
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 13 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1996).

2004

HUMAN SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ...

The increasing use of humanitarian grounds for intervention has expectedly
raised apprehensions in the postcolonial states of the Third World, including
countries like China, India, and Malaysia. 87 This has much to do with their
experience with the colonial interventions. As remarks Johan Galtung "... the
tradition of interventionism has a bad name, reminiscent of the punitive
expeditions by colonial powers in general, and the UK in particular, to punish the
colonized and protect the settlers, and of numerous US military interventions (Iraq
is No. 69 after the Second World War) to exercise control. 88 The resistance to
any alteration in the norms of non-intervention was manifest in strong reactions
from Asian countries to the humanitarian intervention in East Timor.8 9 According
to some Third World analysts the idea of humanitarian intervention discriminating
as it applies only on the powerless third world countries ventilating these third
world sentiments, M.V.Naidu observes:
It is unthinkable against a nuclear weapon's state or even a highly militarized
and industrialized state. It is also doubtful if humanitarian interventions could
take care of generic causes of human rights violation or basic human needs of
the people. Thus, there is a common feeling in the third world that the developed
strategic and national interest in the name of
countries tend to hide their
90
humanitarian intervention.
However in the western eyes, the Third World resistance to any alteration in
the norms of nonintervention is because "[m]any states have skeletons in their
closets with respect to human rights (the UN resolution that condemned Iraqi
repression of the Kurds could not invoke Chapter VII because of China's
objection), and that in particular many new states have - like India - formidable
problems with ethnic or religious minorities." 9
Not by Military Alone
Surely, military option for protecting people in risk is an extreme option and
is fraught with unintended consequences. Any outside action is more acceptable, if
it aggregates sovereignty instead of undermining it. In the short run, people may
welcome outside agencies to secure them but they would soon like to reclaim their
sovereignty. This explains Asian preference for milder forms of interventions to,
protect human security concerns. This includes 'constructive intervention'
proposed by Anwar Ibrahim (to deal with internal conflicts in weaker regional
states such as Cambodia) and 'flexible engagement' mooted by Surin Pitsuan (to
92
deal with the fallout of the regional economic crisis) and the situation in Burma.
"Both concepts maintained a healthy respect for state sovereignty requiring the
87. Acharya, supranote 31.
88. Galtung supra note 31.
89. See generally Klomjit Chandrapanya, Part of the Elite Thinks Policy on East Timor a Mistake,
at
5,
available
17,
1999
at
June
POST,
Thursday,
THE
JAKARTA
http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_- 3_news4.asp.
90. See M.V.Naidu, Security, Sovereignty, and Intervention: Concepts and Case Studies, 34(1)
PEACE RESEARCH (CANADA) 33-58 (2002) for an elaborate discussion of this point.
91. Hoffman, supra note 76, at 33.
92. Acharya,.supra note 31, at 458.
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regime's consent as the prerequisite for collective action."93
Arms embargoes are also a helpful statecraft tool to preempt, delimit, and
defuse violent conflict and human rights abuses. However, embargoes are full of
imperfections and have significant problems with their implementation.94 For
instance, the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) are also the
five largest arms producers who would not easily give up their arms business. The
U.N. led embargoes have been sluggish and are generally imposed after the
protagonists have procured sufficient arms to prosecute a war. In Rwanda, the U.N.
embargo could only be imposed in May 1994 when the genocide had been
underway for several weeks and many thousands of people had already been
slaughtered. 95
Economic sanctions are other methods of pressing human security agenda on
a recalcitrant state unwilling to cooperate in the face of a human catastrophe.
However, the economic sanctions can create humanitarian disasters because of the
practical difficulty of selective targeting. The international community has begun
to recognize the devastating effects of economic sanctions on civilian populations,
and is now placing increased emphasis on so-called "smart sanctions" or "targeted
sanctions," targeting the assets and procurement channels of rogue leaders and
resources that are essential for their rule.96
Third World Anxieties
The human security paradigm provides a transformative framework by
incorporating the imperatives of protecting and empowering people - a long
cherished vision of humanity. Yet in the typical Third World parlance, human
security and humanitarian intervention are often branded as western sponsored
enterprises promoting western values and are used to legitimize intervention
against the poor and weak states.97 Ironically, the critique has come from two
opposite camps. While the 'statist' opposes these doctrines for demolishing the
norms of non-intervention and sovereignty, the civil society finds in it a western
plot to re-colonize the Third World. 98
The truth is that after being relieved from the threat of communist challenge,
93. Id.
94. See Elizabeth Kirkham & Catherine Flew, Strengthening Embargoes and EnhancingHuman
Security: Briefing 17 Biting the Bullet, International Alert-Safe World and University of Bradford, 3
(2003), availableat http://www.intemational-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/BB-Briefingl 71 .pdf.
95. Id. at 21-22.
96. Executive Summary: Making Targeted Sanctions Effective: Guidelinesfor the Implementation
of UN Policy Options, Final Report of the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted
Sanctions, MAKING TARGETED SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE: GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN
POLICY OPTIONS, Uppsala University, Sweden at iii (Wallensteen, et al. eds., 2003).
97. This is despite the two leading exponents of human security- Mahbub-ul-Haq and Amartya
Sen are South Asians. Also there is no dearth of human security related ideas in third world. A cursory
glance at Mahatma Gandhi's writings would evidence this. However it is an irony that the third world
must now address and absorb the concept only after they have been repackaged by donor agencies.
98. Arundhati Roy, The New American Century, opening plenary of the World Social Forum
inMumbai
(Jan.
16,
2004) in The
Nation,
Jan.
22, 2004, available at
www.thenation.com/doc.mthml?i=20040209&s-roy.
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"(t)he questions of human rights, protection of minorities and a right to democratic
government including national self-determination - neglected after the fiasco of
the post Versailles attempts - are again on the agenda of western powers." 99 This
new activism is hailed in many western quarters as a long overdue reclaiming of
the Wilsonian norms of internationalization of democracy as the best guarantee of
peace. Weak states have apprehensions about the possible misuse of humanitarian
intervention; however, this is not an issue with the powerful countries. For them
the critical concern is how to ensure the effective implementation of such
intervention. No wonder the increasing episodes of humanitarian intervention in
the post-Cold War Era have raised endless acrimony and divide. 100 It is not just
legally controversial, but is also to a high degree politically controversial ". . . both
when it has happened as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo and when it has failed to
happen, as in Rwanda."' 10'
While there is no doubt about the responsibilities of the international
community in such situations, where governments are unwilling or incapable or
they perpetuate human insecurities, the truth is that states do not intervene for
primarily humanitarian reasons and tend to use them selectively when it suits their
geo-strategic interest. The problem indeed is how to make 'humanitarian' concerns
compatible with the realpolitik.
The problems are confounded by the inner contradictions in Third World
states. Unlike the more stable and cohesive nation-states of developed west, the
post-colonial states of the Third World are still struggling with the task of nation
building and consolidating their territorial integrity and other state structures.
There are deep-seated divisions, which along with acute scarcity of resources
constantly hamper the process of nation building. Lack of domestic consensus
creates an easy ground for the assertion of autonomy and self-determination by the
disparate groups often evoking a large-scale military response from the state
leading to the violation of human rights and consequent socioeconomic
catastrophes. 0 2 And in many cases the ruling elite either overlook the human
security issues or become a perpetrator of human atrocities. "The paradox of the
state," according to Robert Jackson is "that the most important threats to security
in the Third World (and often elsewhere), arise from states and regimes, and are
directed against individuals and communal groups. 10 3 It is no surprise that the
Third World elite remains so sensitive to any infringement on their sovereignty on

99. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
100. Inger Osterdahl, "Humanitarian Intervention" in Inger Osterdahl, Is Intervention
Humanitarian?ProtectingHuman Rights and Democracy Abroad, Report no. 62, Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden at 3 (eds., 2002)
101. Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, forward to THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY (2001), available at http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-28716-201-1 -DOTOPIC.html.
"03
See generally DONALD L HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985); See also DONALD L.
HOROwIRz, THE DEADLY ETHNIC CONFLIC (2001).
103. ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI-STATES; SOVEREIGNTY; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE
THIRD WORLD, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1990).
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the grounds of human rights protection. As observed succinctly by Paul R.
Williams et. al., "[a]ll too frequently the mantra of sovereignty is used by states to
shield them from international action to prevent them from violating human rights
atrocities in their attempts to stifle self-determination
and committing
04
movement."1
Much like the contention in human rights, 10 5 the discourse on human security
is also haunted by a divide between 'universalists' and 'cultural relativists.' It is
contended that the western notions of human security focus more on western
liberal values such as political rights and ignore a communitarian ethos prevalent
in many Asian societies. 10 6 Accordingly, the Asian statesmen would not like to
compromise development objectives to promote political and civil rights. These
rights could be accorded priority only after the society has reached a certain level
of development. This line of reasoning, according to Stephanie Lawson, "reflects
a pragmatic07 prioritization of categories encapsulated the idea of 'rice before
freedom."1
The criticism also relates to the historic urge in the postcolonial Third World
to shake off the intellectual dependency and evolve an indigenous concept of
security.' 0 8 The predicament is that in the name of developing indigenous
discourse, the elites in many post colonial societies tend to revive obscurantist
traditions or fall into the trap of defending "our national security" and "our nationstate" - once again a legacy of the colonial powers.' 0 9
There are also suspicions in the Third World that human security has a 'donor
driven agenda,' which intends to legitimize the forces of globalization."l 0
"Donors," according to Anne Itto'an, "live far away from the realities of
emergencies and too often have a close-minded paternalistic attitude that they
know what is best; in fact, some agencies have no right to be involved in the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.""' It is also pointed out that while the

104. Paul R. Williams, et al., Resolving Sovereignty- Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of
EarnedSovereignty, 31 DEN. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 347,350 (2003).
105. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 57 (2003).
106. Id,
at 60; see Amitav Acharya, supra note 31, at 45 (China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore
are prominent Asian countries, which advocate the so-called Asian Values). See Amitav Acharya, Guns
and Butters: Why Do Human Security and Traditional Security Coexist in Asia?
ECONOMIC REVIEW 1, 1-21 (2003).
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109. See Behera supra note 6; see also Yash Tandon Towards a Common Security - Alternative
Perspectives of the Third World, 21(4) BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS 385-393 (1990).
110. Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, a paper prepared by the Department
Canada,
at
Trade,
Government
of
Affairs
and
International
of
Foreign
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international agencies such as the UNDP prescribe the values and goals for the
developing countries; the Bretton Woods institutions belonging to the same
developed west advocate an unbridled sweep of globalization and economic
liberalization which tend to undermine precisely that.' 12 There is no dearth of
studies which evidenced the negative role of globalization on land security, food
security, water security and ultimately, human security of poor people in the Third
World. 1 3 The lack of consensus on this issue may in the long run disorient the
role of U.N. agencies in promoting human security. As observes R.A. Coate et
al.:
As privileged positions, statuses, power base and ideologically narrow and culturally specific meanings [of human security] come under threat by the challenge of other
preferred meanings, strong defences can be expected to be mounted. Indeed those
who claim 'high moral ground' in these ideological debates well be in the end fight
Nations, especially as those challenges
against any meaningful role by the United
114
touch on the issue of state sovereignty.
Poverty and Disparities
Human security protagonists are concerned as much with the growing scale of
poverty as with the gnawing global disparities. It is now a truism that poverty
anywhere is poverty everywhere. The continued lopsided development in the
world illustrates the fact that industrial countries, with 26 percent of the
population, account for 78 percent of world production of goods and services, 81
percent of energy consumption, 70 percent of chemical fertilizers, and 87 percent
of world armaments.1 5 As fittingly remarked by Keyman, E. Fuat:
We don't really need to spend another dime on "intelligence" to recognize the
conditions that leave whole countries in a state of despair and misery. Some 1.2
billion people worldwide struggle to survive on $1 day or less 1.2 billion people
lack access to safe drinking water and 2.9 billion have inadequate access to
sanitation. About 150 million children are malnourished, and more than 10
million children under five will die in 2001 alone. At least 150 million people
with
are unemployed and 900 million are "underemployed"-contending
6
inadequate incomes despite long hours of backbreaking work.l1
A 1998 report by the UNDP estimated the annual cost to achieve universal
access to a number of basic social services in all developing countries: $9 billion
would provide water and sanitation for all; $12 billion would cover reproductive
health for all women; $13 billion would give every person on Earth basic health
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and nutrition; and $6 billion would provide basic education for all. 17 These social
and health expenditures are just a fraction of the annual military budget for the
United States alone. Clearly, the unchecked growth of militarism in the world is
the single most constraining factor in helping out people in the situation of human
insecurity. This has led to a rising discontent in impoverished and deprived Third
World youth against the rich, powerful, and imposing west making them easy prey
to the siren song of extremism.
The responsibility of protecting human security eventually rests on the
concerted efforts to promote sustainable human development. Some of the crucial
areas which warrant expanded global efforts for achieving human security goals
are: increasing support for women's education, health, and family planning;
programs to slow population growth; sustained efforts to manage and use forests,
water, and soils-the resources that support most rural economies; regional and
global recognition of the right
of each person to a nationality; and measures to
18
ensure effective citizenship. 8
The United States, given its unique role as the most important mentor of the
international human rights regime, must not be seen as ignoring these legal
obligations at home or abroad. 19 The recent abuse of Iraqi prisoners has affected
its credibility. While decrying the United States for opposing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Benjamin Ferencz, former prosecutor during the Nuremberg
trial, warned: "[t]hey are trying hard to kill the ICC, by fair means or foul.... We
must give law a chance. Arrogance and threats do not encourage friendships. The
trashcans of history are filled with the ashes of nations that were120the superpowers
of their day. It should be clear to all that law is better than war."'
This paper has argued that despite the increasing salience of human security
as a reformist discourse, not much has changed in the domain of realpolitik.
Notwithstanding the occasional winds of change, humanity is still living in the
shadow of national security states, which, on the pretext of making the world a
safer place are erecting more ramparts dividing nations and peoples. Instead of
building a global consensus based on shared responsibilities and not humanitarian
concerns, the geostrategic considerations dominate the schema of humanitarian
interventions. This stultifies the very nomenclature of such interventions.
Finally, there is thus a need to strike a balance among humanitarian,
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political, military interest, and development strategies. Humanitarian action cannot
be an alternative to peace settlements or to development assistance---or the pretext
for military intervention. 121 Non-military options including targeted sanctions
against the unruly ruling elite must be given a full chance.' 22 The touchstone to
determine the legitimacy of any act of intervention should be based on a balanced
assessment of whether, in the long run, it would meet the basic needs of people at
risk. To discourage great powers from violating the principles of equality and
reciprocity, the international community should gradually qualify and eventually
phase out the veto power to ensure that the authoritative decisions-makers in the
Security Council are more representative of the entire world's people. 23 There are
also suggestions for a greater inclusion of women in any such humanitarian
intervention "[s]ince women would tend to relate more to people than to hardware,
they could perhaps constitute 50% of the units.24
The Third World anxieties on the agenda of human security and humanitarian
intervention are not simply the manifestation of faultiness within their national
societies but also symptomatic of asymmetries in the post Cold War international
system. The critical problem before human security discourse, therefore, is to
consider the ways through which the international system could be reformed on the
basis of multilateralism and humanitarian law.
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